Which is the Pulse of Romanian Corporate Governance? – An Empirical Study  by Stanciu, Victoria & Caratas, Maria Alina
 Procedia Economics and Finance  20 ( 2015 )  586 – 594 
2212-5671 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi.
doi: 10.1016/S2212-5671(15)00112-4 
ScienceDirect
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
7th International Conference on Globalization and Higher Education in Economics and Business 
Administration, GEBA 2013 
Which is the pulse of Romanian corporate governance? – An 
empirical study 
Victoria Stanciua, Maria Alina Caratasb* 
a, bThe Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Bucharest 010374, Romania   
Abstract 
This paper aims to emphasize the state of corporate governance in Romanian regulatory framework and the quality of corporate 
governance culture in Romanian organizations. The authors performed an analysis of the manner in which the OECD principles 
and other governance settlements are respected in some of the top Romanian banks. The research emphasized some gaps in the 
Romanian regulation and the need to improve corporate governance implementations. The authors’ contribution consists in 
highlighting those regulatory requirements that should be improved in order to increase the effectiveness of corporate governance 
in Romanian financial institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past years, corporate governance represented a significant concern for academic debates and corporate 
boards. There is unanimous awareness on corporate governance need and benefits and, as the economic and 
financial crisis hardened the restrictions and competition and emphasized the consequences of the weaknesses in the 
companies’ corporate governance, there is a legitimate interest for the topic. For the emerging countries, corporate 
governance is a “must” not an optional alternative for their development and integration in the globalised economy. 
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Corporate governance is crucial for the companies’ growth, ensures the decrease of the economic disparity (in 
regard with developed economies), attracts direct financial investments and consolidates a market-based economy.  
 
For emerging countries, as Romania is, it seems like to be a long and challenging way from declarative 
statements to real and solid corporate governance implementation. This is why, the authors focus on this topic. The 
paper aims to analyze existing corporate governance real enforcement in Romanian listed companies. For the 
empirical study it were selected top banks, some of them listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange. The option to 
select in the sample just banks, even if this reduced significantly the study’s subjects, was determined by the 
multiple regulatory requirements enforced for the banking sector regarding corporate governance. The set of  
regulatory requirements on corporate governance in banks is composed by the Romanian company law, Basel 
Committee requirements completed by European Banking Authority documents on the topic, UE documents and the 
regulations issued by the Romanian National Bank (as the supervisory banking body) implementing the provisions 
of the above mentioned authorities. Another argument for the banking institutions’ selection is represented by the 
main ownership of the Romanian listed banks, ownership that “imported” in the Romanian banks high standards of 
compliance with corporate governance requirements. In this respect, the listed Romanian banks could be considered 
leaders of corporate governance best practice implementation. 
 
2. Literature review 
There is no universally accepted definition of corporate governance. In this respect, Talamo (2011) emphasized 
that almost all definitions aim at analyzing specific aspects of corporate governance. From the numerous definitions, 
the authors retain, for its synthetic but revelatory character, the definition included in the 2000 Cadbury Report and 
Recommendations: “Corporate governance is the system by which businesses are directed and controlled”. This 
definition emphasizes the two major parts involved: the management and the controlling part as well as the 
relationship between ownership and management. From this perspective, Talamo (2011) retains Tricker’s point of 
view who underlined “that management is about running a company and corporate governance is about ensuring that 
the company is run properly”. In opposite of the synthetic definition contained in the Cadbury Report, there are 
more detailed definitions trying to emphasize the complexity of the corporate governance process. In this regard, 
Standard and Poor’s (2012) retains the European Banking Authority definition: “corporate governance is a broad 
concept that can be described as a set of relationships between an institution, its management, its shareholders and 
other stakeholders”. The definition is extended providing explicit details on the components of the internal 
governance considered as “a limited but crucial component of corporate governance”. 
Hardi and Buti (2012) emphasize that there is no one recommended model of corporate governance that works in 
all countries and companies. This is the reason why OECD issued its set of principles for corporate governance, 
underlines the weaknesses identified in time and suggests recommendations for corporate governance 
implementations. Peters et al (2011) consider that for achieving the goal to provide a national code of corporate 
governance, there are two ways: importation or self-definition of corporate governance principles. In this regard, 
Young and Peng (2008) pointed out that the attempts to import governance systems may be ineffective. Importing 
governance systems without taking into consideration local vectors, as for example the legal and fiscal system, 
cultural issues, accounting practices, limited number of professional managers could be ineffective. The option 
could be a tailored version of a standard corporate governance model taking into consideration the local 
backgrounds. Young and Peng (2008) emphasize that “the corporate governance structures in emerging economies 
often resemble those of developed economies in form but not is substance”. The remark is trenchant but realistic and 
reflects the significant challenges the emerging countries are exposed to. Peters et al. (2011) explain that this 
situation is caused by fast adoption of foreign regulation on the pressure of the international bodies (as for example 
the EU institutions), the instable and incomplete legal environment, cultural issues, limited number of professional 
managers, the heritage of the past in the people mentality and the survival of past practices under new governance 
structures etc. The real challenge for the state institutions in emerging countries is to create a functional background 
(inclusively an integration of the company low with corporate governance framework) that enable an accurate and 
undertaken implementation of the corporate governance code in most companies. 
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3. A comparative analysis of UK corporate governance code and BSE’s code  
Dobroteanu and Răileanu (2009) retains that, according to FRC, corporate governance is “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled […]. The board’s actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders 
in general meeting”. The purpose of corporate governance consists in facilitating the effective, entrepreneurial and 
prudent management in order to deliver the long-term success of companies. The UK Code highlights the 
importance of general principles, which should guide board behaviours in order to increase the effectiveness of their 
communication with the shareholders. This Code applies to all companies with a Premium listing of equity shares 
regardless of whether they are incorporated in the UK or elsewhere. The UK Code is not a rigid set of rules and 
represents a guide for board’s good practices. The UK Code underlines the main principles of good governance: 
accountability, transparency, probity and focus on companies’ sustainable success. However, the code cannot 
guarantee effective board behaviour. The UK Code gives the boards the possibility to decide for themselves how 
they should act. Companies do have the freedom to choose and use governance policies in the light of the above 
mentioned principles. The “Comply or explain” approach is the trademark of corporate governance in the UK. 
Companies have either to confirm that they comply with the provisions of UK Code or, if they do not comply, to 
provide an explanation.  
Our research findings highlight certain common features between UK Code and the Bucharest Stock Exchange 
(BSE) one. It is mandatory for us to point out that both the UK Code and BSE’s Code start from a principle based 
approach to corporate governance. Therefore, we agree with Dobroteanu et al. (2009) who consider that “Romania’s 
adherence to a flexible system governed by principle deserves to be praised, particularly because it comes after a 
long tradition on rule-based national regulations”. We notice that OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance 
(2011) were considered the benchmark for the concept on governance in Romania. Ionascu and Calu (2011), 
referring to OECD’s definition, state that “the corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among the different participants in the organisation such as the board, managers, shareholders and 
other stakeholders and lays down the rules and procedures for decision-making”. 
Ionascu et al. (2011) analysing the initial stage of corporate governance in Romania, reveal a set of malfunctions 
such as: the neglect of minor shareholders rights or an unequal treatment of shareholders, the formal role of the 
board of directors – its position being dominated by the major shareholder.  
The Bucharest Stock Exchange issued a revised version of the Romanian Corporate Governance Code which is 
structured into articles, principles and recommendations concerning different areas of governance aspects: role, size 
and structure of the boards, boards committees; members’ independence, audit committee and auditors, 
remuneration, relation with the shareholders, financial and business reporting, disclosure and transparency rules. As 
the UK Code, the BSE’s Code consists of principles and provisions. As Dobroteanu et al. (2009) underline the code 
provisions are voluntary except for the listed companies that are determined to report on a “comply or explain” 
statement attached to the annual report.  
Our comparative analysis reveals some common features between the BSE’s Code and that of the UK Code. As 
we have just mentioned before, the two codes indicate a principle-based approach to corporate governance. Our 
findings show that BSE’s Code is more permissive than that of the UK Code. However, we understand this approach 
because Romania is still at a starting point concerning governance strengthening process. The two analysed codes 
opt for a majority of independent members within board’s committees. The UK Code best highlights the 
responsibilities and the role of audit committee and internal audit. Our research findings help us to build a current 
profile of corporate governance in Romania comparative to that in UK. In authors’ opinion, there are some 
weaknesses in Romanian governance:   
x The boards have a limited position within the companies. They are susceptible to be influenced by large 
controlling shareholders who have appointed them. 
x There is not an effectively defined corporate governance culture within Romanian companies with the exception 
of the big ones that benefit from the foreign mother company corporate culture. 
x Shareholders’ voting rights are not a fundamental mechanism for protecting their position, especially those of 
minority shareholders. 
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x Romanian Code needs specific clarifications concerning information disclosure and transparency.  
x BSE’s Code needs a detailed requirement concerning the updating of competencies and skills of board’s directors 
and auditors as well as concerning information about directors and executives which will help investors to assess 
better their competence and a possible conflict of interests. 
x There is limited information available on the remuneration disclosure of board members and executives within 
the Romanian Code. 
x BSE Code’s recommendations should highlight an increased role of audit committees in overseeing internal 
control.  
x The Romanian Code does not stipulate any explicit responsibilities of boards in ensuring effective financial 
reporting. 
Even if BSE’s Code was created after the UK’s model, we assume that there is a long way for establishing a 
viable formula for Romanian companies and institutions acting in those particular circumstances. Regulators should 
counterbalance the present weaknesses of Romanian governance framework and increase transparency, relevance 
and disclosure in order to prevent abuses and cover risks. Furthermore, Romania should continue its alignment 
process to the convergence with international standards for accounting and auditing. We state that with effective 
corporate governance structures and with an active implication of shareholders in governance process, management 
will be determined to improve operations for attracting investors in order to achieve the economic growth even in a 
difficult context.  
 
4. Corporate governance in Romanian banking system  
Corporate governance represents a key preoccupation for companies as well as for the national and international 
authorities aiming at improving governance. The significant corporate governance weaknesses registered in the 
financial industry determined the crisis that impacted significantly entirely world economy. European Commission 
and OECD pointed out the severe problems registered in corporate governance and offered recommendations for 
improved governance implementations and understanding. In its documents the European Commission (2010) 
analysing financial sectors affected by the crisis emphasized that effective corporate governance should take into 
account apart shareholders’ interests, those of other relevant stakeholders. It was revealed also a new attitude of the 
shareholders that proved profit interests in short-term that affect the long-term governance objectives, by taking 
increased risks. The European Commission Green Paper (2010) presents Gaspar et al. (2005) point of view 
emphasizing that “in this respect, the sought-after alignment of directors’ interests with those of these new 
categories of shareholders has amplified risk-taking and, in many cases, contributed to excessive remuneration for 
directors, based on short-term share value of the company/financial institution as the only performance criterion”.  
Moreover, the supervisory systems have failed to set up effective governance best practices and have not been able 
to carry out adequate supervision. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision/BCBS does represent a major engine 
for promoting sound corporate governance practices for banking organizations. The initial core points of BCBS’s 
(2010) guidance issued in 2006 involved: the role of boards in approving bank’s strategy; strong and clear 
responsibilities within the company; compensation policies in accordance with the results; good management of 
transparency risks. However, because of a number of failures in the banking sector, BCBS had to review its 2006 
guidance. Its interest focused more on some significant issues such as: board practices, senior management, risk 
management and internal control, compensation, corporate governance structure, disclosure and transparency. 
In accordance with these issues mentioned by BCBS, we have studied and evaluated the annual reports and 
management statements of some of the top banks in Romania during 2012 (in terms of total assets) such as: BCR, 
BRD, Raiffeisen Bank, CEC Bank and Banca Transilvania that register more than 50% of the total banking assets.  
In the present study, the authors have assessed banks’ approaches on corporate governance which, as we come to 
believe, are proportionate to the banks’ size, complexity, structure, risk profile and even the economic and financial 
significance on market. We have evaluated weather the banks have effective mechanisms for supporting boards and 
senior management to fulfil their responsibilities. We have also tried to assess banks’ different policies and 
processes as well as the control functions as they are disclosed within their annual reports. We have checked the 
respect of recommendations concerning board composition and members’ independence in accordance with OECD 
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Principles and BSE’s Corporate Governance Code. In order to achieve our comparative analysis, we have studied 
the place and role of shareholders, the distribution of duties and responsibilities between boards of directors and 
shareholders. Finally we have drawn up our opinions to the extent to which the analysed banks adopt and conform to 
corporate governance codes, regulations and guidelines of good practices. For our research demarche, we have taken 
into consideration the OECD principles that establish the indicators of corporate governance status. In addition to 
those principles, we have consulted other significant governance guidelines such as: Basel Committee’s “Principles 
for enhancing corporate governance”, the Green Paper of European Commission 2010, the European Commission’s 
Directive 46/2006, other national law and regulations, Corporate Governance Scores issued by Standard & Poor’s 
(2002).  
Corporate Governance Score/CGS of a company represents Standard and Poor’s assessment of an organization’s 
governance practices and policies and the extent to which these serve the interests of financial stakeholders, with an 
emphasis on shareholders’ interests. The authors retained from Standard & Poor’s document (2002) that the CGS is 
not an audit, a financial advice, nor a recommendation made by Standard and Poor’s. Its purpose is to benchmark 
the current corporate governance standards of a company. We have started our research analysis by taking into 
account the four individual components of Standard and Poor’s Corporate Governance Scores: governance structure 
and influence; board structure and process; financial stakeholders’ rights and relations (financial stakeholders 
include both shareholders and creditors); transparency and disclosure. At those components we have added some 
sub-categories in order to support our assessment. 
Before presenting our research findings, we should highlight that, among the analysed banks, only in case of 
CEC Bank, we could not develop our analysis. CEC is a bank adopting the one-tier administration system whose 
single shareholder is the Romanian state, represented by the Public Finances Ministry. This bank is governed by the 
Board of Directors formed by 11 members. However, we notice that there is no supplementary information 
concerning the composition of the board or of its members’ independence. In the case of CEC Bank, there is a 
limited disclosure of information. In our opinion, this limited disclosure and the type of the ownership are not 
accidental. In the subsections below, the authors will present their analysis and only the findings concerning BCR, 
BRD, Raiffeisen and Banca Transilvania. 
 
4.1. The first analysis driver: Governance structure and influence  
Table no. 1 presents in brief the information on the governance structures in the analysed banks.  
 
Table 1. Governance structure and influence 
  General Meeting of Shareholders    Supervisory bodies Mem 
bers 
Executive management Mem 
ersb 
BCR  -majority shareholders 
93,5722%; 
-SIF Oltenia 6,2973%; 
-other stakeholders 0,1305% 
Supervisory Council 








BRD -majority shareholders 60,17%; 
-financial investment companies 
22,27%; 
-other stakeholders 17,56% 
Board of Directors 
Audit, Remuneration and 
Risk Committees 
11 Executive committee 7 
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Raiffeisen -majority shareholders 99,49%; 
-minority shareholders 0,51% 
(17000 pers.) 
Supervisory Council Audit 
Committee 
-Remuneration Committee 
-Management Committee of   
Significant Risks 
 
7 Board of Directors 





-Romanian shareholders 45,74%; 
-Foreign shareholders 54,26% 









For analysing banks’ corporate governance, we studied their annual reports, the management statements, 
auditors’ reports as well as banks’ reports on transparency and public disclosure requirements. Moreover, we 
assessed the “Comply or explain” statements, for those banks which complied with such an obligation for the listed 
companies (as it is the case of Banca Transilvania). As it is issued in the Annual Reports of the analysed banks, they 
deploy their activity according to current Romanian laws and regulations such as: Law 31/1990 (Company Law), 
OUG 99/2006 (Banking Law), other banking regulation and settlements. We notice that, in the case of these 
mentioned banks, all of them comply with the settlements concerning the General Meeting of the Shareholders that 
represents the banks’ supreme body. The general meeting could be ordinary or extraordinary and it meets at least 
once a year. We notice that the main competencies of the General Meeting of Shareholders are similar for all the 
researched banks. Moreover, we highlight that the banks declare in their reports that the positions of Chairman and 
CEO are usually held by the same persons. We consider that this latter issue does not address the Financial 
Reporting Council (2012) recommendation.  
a) BCR - Being a leader of Romanian banking system, finds corporate governance as a key element for its success. 
The bank considers that it addresses the stakeholders’ expectations, thanks to an integrated system of values, 
principles and procedures. BCR is administered in two-tier system by a Supervisory Council and the management 
body: the Executive Committee. The Supervisory Council supervises, manages and coordinates the activity of the 
Executive Council. The 7 members of the Supervisory Council have a mandate of three years. They could not be 
members of the Executive Committee or bank’s employees. They should have the competences and skilled required 
by law and applicable regulations. This council meets every three months.  
b) BRD adopted the one-tier administration system in accordance with the effective corporate governance 
objectives and principles, including information transparency, shareholders’ rights protection as well as those of 
other relevant stakeholders. The governing body is the Board of Directors which is elected by the General Meeting 
of the Shareholders. The latter approves the remuneration policy for the non-executive members of the board as well 
as the general limits for the supplementary remuneration of directors. The Boards of Directors delegates the 
executive management to the Executive Committee. 
c) Raiffeisen Bank - The bank’s Annual Report on Corporate Responsibility (2012) states that Raiffeisen uses the 
Global Reporting Initiative/GRI as a model for analysing and assessing its corporate governance as well as for 
measuring its current level of transparency and sustainability. The Supervisory Council exercises the permanent 
control of bank’s management and it meets, at least, every three months. It is formed by 7 members with a four 
years mandate and, among those members, there is an independent one.  
d) Banca Transilvania is the first listed bank in Romania at the Bucharest Stock Exchange (in 1997). The BT 
representatives declared that corporate governance represents for BT a set of responsibilities and practices of 
governing bodies that are expected to offer strategic directions and to cover risks. The bank develops a system of 
risk’s identification, evaluation, monitoring, control and reporting. We notice that BT registers the “Comply or 
explain” Statement. 
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4.2. The second analysis driver: Board structure and process  
a) BCR - The operative management of BCR is ensured by the Executive Council/Management Board that is 
formed by 7 members designed by the Supervisory Council having a four years mandate. One of its members is the 
Chairman that is in charge with the general executive management within the bank. We notice that BCR allows a 
great importance of remuneration and compensation policies as it is shown in the bank’s 2012 Report on 
transparency and public disclosure requirements. The bank describes the main principles of its compensation policy, 
remuneration and compensation being established in accordance with effective risk management procedure. This 
policy involves an incentive structure able to attract, motivate and retain the most valuable persons within the bank. 
Board’s remuneration and compensation policy is approved by the Supervisory Council, after being advised by the 
Remuneration Committee.  
b) BRD - The Board is elected by the General Meeting of Shareholders for a four years mandate. It is formed by 11 
members. Board’s structure is able to ensure the equilibrium between the executive and non-executive members so 
as no one could dominate the making-decision process, as it is stated within the OECD Principles and BSE’s Code. 
The board establishes 3 committees: Audit, Remuneration and Risk Management Committees. We notice that there 
is not a Nomination Committee, as it is suggested within the BSE’s Code and Companies’ Law. The board 
establishes risk management strategies and approves the remuneration policy. It meets at least every three months 
for its monitoring activity. The board assesses the independence of its non-executive members and all the members 
are supposed to update permanently their competencies and skills. The executive management is delegated by the 
board to the Executive Committee which is formed by 7 executive directors.  
c) Raiffeisen Bank - The board has full competency on bank’s management. It consists of 7 members elected by the 
Supervisory Council for a four years mandate. In order to ensure good governance, the board delegates different 
tasks to 12 consultative committees. The main 3 committees of Raiffeisen Bank are: Audit Committee (3 members); 
Remuneration Committee (3 members); Management Committee of Significant Risks (15 members). 
d) Banca Transilvania - The General Meeting of Shareholders assigns bank’s governing function to the Board of 
Directors which is formed by 7 non-executive members. One of these members holds the position of Chairman and 
he is elected by the board. The other members of the board are elected by the General Meeting of Shareholders for a 
four years mandate. According to the Romanian National Bank’s settlements, the board represents for BT the 
supervisory body. The board meets at least once a month and at least half of its members should participate at each 
meeting. The main committees subordinated to the board are: Audit Committee which is formed by 3 non-executive 
board members and Remuneration Committee formed by board’s Chairman and other 2 members. The 
Remuneration Committee meets at least twice a year. 
The Management Executive Committee should manage the bank on its own responsibility, taking into account 
the best interest of the bank. This committee is formed by 11 members: the General Manager, 2 Deputy General 
Managers and 8 executive directors. They are all elected by the Board. The decisions of the Management Executive 
Committee are communicated to other consultative committees established and its branches in order to accomplish 
the duties and responsibilities. 
4.3. The third analysis driver: Financial stakeholder rights and relations  
Concerning this analysis driver, we notice that the analysed banks have a lot of common points. In all the studied 
cases, the shares grant the holders equal rights such as: the right to vote in the General Meeting; the right to 
participate in the distribution of profit; other rights provided by the legislation in force. Ownership rights over the 
shares could be transferred. The shares bear dividends. All shareholders could participate to the general meetings 
personally or by a representative. The General Meeting of Shareholders is called by the Management Board. The 
call notice is published in widely distributed newspapers and published on the bank’s web page at least 30 calendar 
days before the meeting. In order to ensure the equitable treatment of shareholders, the banks make available to 
them all the necessary information concerning the general meetings. However, we remark that only BRD furnishes 
weak public information concerning this point of the analysis. At the opposite side, BCR that is the leader of 
Romanian banking systems discloses a particular Charter involving financial stakeholders’ rights and relations. 
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4.4. The fourth analysis driver: Transparency and disclosure 
From our analysis, we concluded that BCR, BRD, Raiffeisen and BancaTransilvania address the Romanian 
National Bank requirements concerning the assurance of an adequate information transparency as well as those 
made by OECD and BSE Code. For such a purpose, the banks issue annually the Report on transparency and public 
disclosure requirements which involves information disclosed also on banks’ websites and even supplementary 
information regarding the risk management objectives and policies. The supplementary information covers, in 
general, the following interest fields: management and board’s structure; the nature of the third parties transactions; 
the functions of internal control system; the reporting systems.  
We notice that the analysed banks’ financial statements comply with the accounting standards applicable to credit 
institutions as well as with IFRS. The annual consolidated financial statements reflect a true and fair view of the 
financial position and performance and further information related to the banks' activities.  
The Audit Reports issued by the independent financial auditors (agreed by the Romanian National Bank as 
supervision body) state that the banks comply with the settlements regulating financial statements. The auditors 
underline that banks’ management is responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of financial statements. 
The auditors’ responsibility consists in expressing their own opinion on these financial statements.  
Moreover, all the banks disclose timely and adequate information to the shareholders, as it is stipulated in the 
different corporate governance codes, in national and international recommendations issued on this subject.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Our research findings assume that there are some differences at the extent by which Romanian banks understand 
and implement corporate governance. Some banks in Romania use a two-tier structure (as BCR, Raiffeisen) where 
the supervisory function of the board is performed by a separate entity (the supervisory board) without executive 
attributions. Other banks use a one-tier structure (as BRD, CEC Bank). Our analysis highlights that, at present, in 
Romania, the national laws, regulations, corporate governance code and the listing requirements are not sufficiently 
robust in order to address banks’ governance needs. We sustain that the existing corporate governance principles are 
not significantly precise and therefore, they let to a series of interpretations. We also observe the lack of a clear 
allocation of responsibilities between management, boards and supervisory bodies. Moreover, the fact that there is 
no legal obligation to comply with the recommendations of the governance authorities, leads to the lack of effective 
and advanced implementation of corporate governance within Romanian financial institutions. The purpose of our 
exploratory study consists in drawing up the current corporate governance profile in some of the Romanian top 
banks compared with the OECD and BSE’s requirements. At this point of our discussion we set up the following 
conclusions: 
According to the OECD principle of ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework, we 
consider that the analyzed banks have a weakly implemented governance culture. In general, they promote 
transparent governance (by means of their reports, statements) but they are not consistent with the division of 
responsibilities among different bodies in their corporate governance structure.  
BCR, BRD, Raiffeisen and Banca Transilvania respect the basic shareholders rights, mainly those linked to 
voting rights, ownership registration, participation at meetings, election and replacing of board members. However, 
we notice that BRD discloses weak information concerning the above rights. We assume that it is important for 
shareholders to be engaged in governance process of financial institutions and to monitor senior management’s 
decision-making. The banks need to implement measures for facilitating the exercise of ownership rights of all 
shareholders seen as individuals. In addition, it should be a good communication between all the shareholders in 
relation to their basic rights. Meanwhile banks should take their own measures against shareholders’ abuses.  
The banks we have studied do not demonstrate, by the information disclosed, a great importance to information 
concerning possible conflicts of interests or third-parties transactions as it is stipulated in OECD Principles or in the 
UK Corporate Governance Code. 
Another non-respect of corporate governance principles as they are issued by OECD consists in the fact that the 
analyzed banks do not stipulate measures against shareholders’ rights violations.  
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In relation to the OECD principle concerning disclosure and transparency, all the analyzed banks use to disclose 
general information about their company objectives, financial results, governance structure and policies, ownership 
and shareholders’ rights. However, we have noticed that those banks do not provide detailed information concerning 
remuneration policy for board members and executives, excepting BCR. All the banks do have independent, 
competent and qualified auditors who provide their own opinion concerning financial statements. 
Generally speaking, the mentioned banks treat the boards in compliance with the OECD Principles and the BSE 
Code, especially those referring to board’s structure, composition (the equilibrium between the executive and non-
executive directors, the independence of members) and responsibilities.  
As a general conclusion of this paper, we state that Romania needs, in general, a more effective legal 
environment for good corporate governance. At this point, we should take into consideration the importance of 
Company Law. We conclude that the degree of effectiveness of Romanian’s legal system will lead to the increase of 
governance’s effectiveness. 
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